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THE VIEW OF HABERMAS FROM BELOW: DOUBTS ABOUT
THE CENTRALITY OF LAW AND THE LEGITIMATION
ENTERPRISE
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA*

Jirgen Habermas is the most influential living philosopher in the
world today. The breadth of his learning, and the scope and erudition of
his work, are unmatched. With the publication of Between Facts and
Norms,' Habermas has made his most systematic foray into the field of
law. And the result is spectacular. Drawing up philosophy, legal theory,
political theory, social theory, history, anthropology and sociology, he
has attempted nothing less than a total reconstruction of the fields of legal and political theory, taking on all of their central dilemmas, and applying his discourse theory to resolve long-standing puzzles or impasses.
The already large and growing body of literature responding to this
work has generally been supportive. Understandably, few critics have
taken on this imposing book at its most grand level. Rather, most have
supported Habermas's overall project, limiting their criticisms to selected
problems. In this modest commentary I will do the same, though the
problems I address are, I believe, central to his exercise. The primary
contribution I hope to make to the discussion will come from exploring a
viewpoint that I have not yet seen raised-the view from below.
By "view from below," I am referring to two distinct groups: the
view of those who are not participants in legal theory discourse, lay people in particular; and the view of societies outside the West. As a Western law professor who has produced legal theory, I cannot claim any
special privilege in relation to these views from below. However, I feel
an affinity to them. I have lived and worked as a lawyer in a developing
country for two years, and have studied and written on the subject, and
while I am an avid consumer of philosophy, I am not formally trained in
it. This background provides me with some insight into how these perspectives might approach Habermas's work.

* Professor, St. John's University School of Law. I would like to thank Elizabeth van
Schilfgaarde and Peter van Schilfgaarde for their critical comments on earlier drafts of this article. I
would also like to thank Professor Habermas for his graceful response to the presentation upon
which this article is based.
1.

JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMs, CONTRmIUTIONS TO A DiSCOURSE

THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).
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I. Two CENTRAL HABERMASIAN THESES

I will apply the view from below to test two theses central to
Habermas's reconstruction. To my knowledge, neither of these theses
has been challenged seriously in the responsive literature. I suspect this
omission is because, among social theorists and legal philosophers, they
are widely assumed to be correct. Habermas assumed them without offering virtually any supportive evidence.2 The first thesis is that law is
central to the organization of complex societies; the second is that legitimation is essential to law. In Habermas's view, these two theses are
intimately connected:
Today legal norms are what is left from a crumbled cement of society; if all other mechanisms of social integration are exhausted, law
yet provides some means for keeping together complex and centrifugal societies that otherwise would fall into pieces.
Modem law grants, however, stability of behavioral expectations only on the condition that people can accept enacted and enforceable norms at the same time as legitimate norms that deserve
intersubjective recognition.3
These two theses are of fundamental significance to Habermas. His
entire argument is built upon their edifice. According to Habermas, the
disenchantment of the lifeworld and the division of labor-the loss of
faith in religion and the breakdown of shared values, customs and traditions-has dissolved the glue that previously kept society intact. Contrary to invisible hand or market theories, in his view, the instrumental
rationality of a community of self-interested actors is not sufficiently
self-organizing to hold society together. There is nothing to coordinate
behavioral expectations between strangers. Moreover, the differentiation
of modem society into increasingly autonomous subsystems (political,
economic, family) increases the likelihood that we will lose the ability to
exert control over the circumstances of our existence. As Habermas dramatically put it, "how can disenchanted, internally differentiated and
pluralized lifeworlds be socially integrated if, at the same time, the risk
of dissension is growing, particularly in the spheres of communicative
action that have been cut loose from the ties of sacred authorities and
released from the bonds of archaic institutions?'"
Riding to the rescue, modem law, for Habermas, is the key lynchpin
that mediates the relationship between system and lifeworld (to use his

2. An extensive discussion by Habermas of these two theses, especially the first, can be
found in his earlier book, Legitimation Crisis. JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1975).
3. Jtirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, An Author's Reflections, 76 DENy. U. L.
REV. 937,937-38 (1999).
4. HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 26.
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terminology). "Modem law steps in to fill the functional gaps in social
orders whose integrative capacities are overtaxed."5 Without the integrating function served by modem law, society would collapse, and/or
there would be no effective form of communication between the lifeworld and system." However, the consequences of disenchantment also
are visited upon law. Law too has been deprived of metaphysical and
religious support, and, in modem, pluralistic societies which lack a
shared morality or tradition, it cannot count on an underlying normative
consensus.! The efficacy of law, according to Habermas, is contingent
upon the sense of the populace that law is legitimate, but under these
circumstances it must find a new basis for legitimation.
[M]odem law can stabilize behavioral expectations in a complex society with structurally differentiated lifeworlds and functionally independent subsystems only if law, as regent for a "societal community"
that has transformed itself into civil society, can maintain the inherited claim to solidarity in the abstract form of an acceptable claim to
legitimacy.8
Such an abstract claim to legitimacy is precisely what Habermas's
discourse principle supplies. He states the principle as follows: "Only
those [legal] norms are valid to which all persons possibly affected could
agree as participants in rational discourses."9 Viewed in political terms,
the discourse principle provides the internal relation between democracy
and the rule of law.'" Laws generated by democratic means are consistent
with the discourse principle; the addressees of laws are also their authors,
which means we remain free even as we live under the rule of law. "The
principle of democracy is what then confers legitimating force on the
legislative process.." "At the posttraditional level of justification, as we
would say today, the only law that counts as legitimate is one that could
be rationally accepted by all citizens in a discursive process of opinionand will-formation."' 2
Here is a bare outline of Habermas's argument:
1. Society is in danger of falling apart owing to anomie;

5. Id.at42.
6. See id. at 55-56.
7. See id.
at 33-34.
8. Id. at 76.
9. Habermas, supra note 3, at 940 (emphasis added); see also HABERMAS, supra note 1, at
104 ("[T]he legitimacy of law ultimately depends on a communicative arrangement: as participants
in rational discourses, consociates under law must be able to examine whether a contested norm
meets with, or could meet with, the agreement of all those possibly affected.").
10. This relationship is an intimate one. "Legal (political) rights are necessary for the proper
constitution and exercise of the democratic process; while, at the same time, the democratic process
is what legitimates law. Thus the relationship between legitimate law and the democratic principle is
circular. They are 'co-originally constituted."' HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 122.
11. Id.atl2l.
12. Id.at135.
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2. Law must rescue society;
3.

But law needs legitimation to be effective;

4. Discourse theory rescues law;
5.

Society is saved.

Building upon discourse theory, Habermas goes on to reconcile or overcome some of the fundamental antinomies that perennially confound
legal and political theory, including those between liberalism and republicanism (and, respectively, private autonomy and public autonomy),
legal positivism and natural law, and facts and values.
It is beyond my capacity to meet these arguments, many of which I find
thought provoking and compelling. My response will be limited to drawing
upon the view from below to question whether in fact society is in danger of
falling apart, whether law is what keeps it together, whether law must be
seen as legitimate to be effective, and, if so, what generates this legitimacy
and whether discourse theory is an effective form of legitimation.
II. THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIETY
Western social theorists, for the past couple of centuries, though
extending earlier, have been obsessed with the question of what holds
society together. This obsession is related undoubtedly to the dislocations
caused by industrialization, population growth and movement (urbanization, trans-border), huge increases in the numbers of poor and their
proximity to the wealthy, and the ever-present threat and reality of war.
To theorists at the end of the nineteenth century, like Durkheim and
Weber, there was a sense that something unique in the history of humankind was occurring, an exhilarating yet frightening transition from the
known to the unknown. The promise of modernity, at least in terms of
generating new products and wealth, seemed limitless. The melding of
people and machines in institutions was a wonder of organization and
efficiency that generated pride in the human capacity. But the working
and living conditions of the laborers were often abominable. And it was
impossible to ignore the impending masses of poor.
Contributing to this sense of uncertainty was more than just a change
in the material conditions of society. Traditional knowledge and beliefs
were under increasing siege by science and the Enlightenment. The remorseless destruction of these beliefs beneath the critical scrutiny of reason is what led to the earlier mentioned disenchantment of the world. For
an intellectual this meant liberation, up to a point. All moorings were being
lost, with no replacements in sight. Science could provide knowledge but
not purpose. Rationality supplied means but not ends. If neither God nor
absolute morality required it, "Why be good?" It was a question they could
not answer convincingly to themselves. Their fear was that the masses
would be led to the same conclusion. When the elite act without concern
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for the good, it is considered decadent by the intellectual, to be frowned
upon (or celebrated), but not feared. In contrast, the prospect that the
masses would act without concern for the good threatens the very destruction of society. After all, why do the poor put up with their perpetually
abysmal and patently unjust condition when a better life, or at least more
food and goods, is there within their reach to be seized?
Society, as social theorists knew or imagined it, seemed to be in imminent threat of breakdown. These threatening social circumstances, I am
suggesting, explain why the first concern of social theorists has been the
problem of social order, which has dominated sociology since its inception. When grappling with this problem, a favorite activity of social theorists has been to construct comparisons between primitive and modem
society. Durkheim's famous contrast between the "mechanical" solidarity
of primitive societies and the "organic" solidarity of modem society
epitomizes this approach."3 His thesis was that primitive societies were
held together by a shared mechanical, collective conscience. Modem societies, by contrast, are characterized by a division of labor, which results
in a loss of shared values. The absence of the collective conscience of
primitive societies is replaced in modem societies by the integrative ability
of law. According to Durkheim, primitive law was retributive, while modem law is oriented toward restitution, effecting a shift away from c6ercion
toward consensus. Thus he characterized modem law and modem society
in a progressive way.
Law is an attractive candidate for solving the problem of social order. Its most visible task is the maintenance of order, including the preservation of property. To put the suspicion more bluntly, for one concemed not just about order but about one's own privileged position in
that order, social and legal theory nicely help legitimate Law (by characterizing it as important and good), and a good and important Law helps
legitimate society. Durkheim's portrayal of law in modem society is
clearly favorable by contrast to his characterization of law in primitive
society. Indeed, many social and legal theorists, including Habermas,
characterize law's role in modem society as rather heroic.
It would not be fair to saddle Habermas with the details of Durkheim's contrast between primitive and modem societies. By his own
account, however, Habermas does "side with Emile Durkheim" in his
view of the central role that law plays in modem society." In the fundamental respects that matter here, their accounts are strongly parallel. The
problem is that Durkheim was not concerned with accurately representing pre-modem societies. Rather, his intention was to understand modem
13. See EMILE DURKHEIM, SELECTED WRITINGS 123-44 (Anthony Giddens ed. & trans.,
1972).
14. Habermas, supra note 3, at 937. In Legitimation Crisis, Habermas discusses the contrast
between primitive and modem societies in a manner strongly reminiscent of Durkheim. See
HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 1-31.
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societies. His contrast was a caricature that has since been sharply challenged by anthropologists and sociologists. 5 Just as pre-modem societies
were never as mechanical-unthinking extensions of the collective
mind-as Durkheim portrayed,"6 modem societies are not as pervaded by
a loss of shared values as the term anomie suggests. Once this contrast is
placed into doubt, it is not at all evident that there has been a need for a
new mechanism to integrate complex societies-that society would have
collapsed had law not been there to fill the gap.
The foregoing summary characterization of the circumstances and
motivations surrounding the obsession of social theorists with the problem of social order, and their reasons for identifying law as the solution,
is admittedly superficial and cynical. And I offer no evidence to support
it. My purpose in suggesting it is to prompt us to create some distance
from the assumption that law is essential to the integration of modem
society, and to question it. For too long it has passed as an accepted truth,
when in fact it is grounded in speculation which originated under the
pressures of specific historical circumstances and concerns.
Beyond the general suspicions raised above, there are several concrete reasons to demand that the thesis identify some form of empirical
support, granting that it is one of those speculations about the nature of
society which cannot be tested through experiment. The first reason is
that, despite the fact that the project of modernity has accelerated in the
century since Durkheim first wrote, it is not easy to identify societies
which have collapsed for lack of law to serve as an integrative mechanism. Various societies have suffered breakdown--especially economic
and political in origin--to be sure, but none that can be easily attributed
directly to the loss of values and the failure of law to subsequently fill in
the vacuum. Keep in mind, furthermore, that many of the societies that
have undergone vast changes from the impact of modernity have not had
strong legal traditions, especially those outside the West. Modernity and
its consequences have virtually swept the globe, leaving severe dislocations in its wake. Given the weakness of law in many locales,'7 if the thesis that law serves the essential role of integrating society in the modem
era is correct, surely we would have seen a number of clear examples of
societal breakdown.
One possible answer to this line of reasoning is that societal breakdown is a gradual process-the loss of values occurs slowly-and law
15. See, e.g., Gerald Turkel, Testing Durkheim: Some Theoretical Considerations, 13 L. &
Soc'Y REV. 721, 724-27 (1978).
16. Malinowski's Crime and Custom in Savage Society helped dispel the notion of mechanistic adherence to customs and culture. See BRONISLAW MAUNOwSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN
SAVAGE SOCIETY 63--64 (Littlefield, Adams & Co. 1959) (1926).
17. For a case study of the impact of transplanted Western law on a non-Western society, see
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, UNDERSTANDING LAW IN MICRONESIA: AN INTERPRETIVE APPROACH TO

TRANSPLANTED LAW (1993).
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happens to fill the breach with just enough strength to keep society integrated and functioning. The functional needs of society, in other words,
insure that law-as a subsystem that contributes to the survival of the
whole-will develop in the precise proportion necessary to prevent a
society from collapsing. But that answer smacks of Panglossian functionalist rationalization formulated in a manner that is impervious to
refutation, a type of reasoning which has long been in disfavor precisely
because it cannot be disproven (and thus does not qualify as a scientific
or empirical proposition). 8
A second compelling reason to challenge the Durkheim/Habermas
thesis is that it appears to reverse the actual order of dependency as between law and society. Habermas asserts that "if all other mechanisms of
social integration are exhausted, law yet provides some means for keeping together complex and centrifugal societies that otherwise would fall
into pieces."' 9 However, it is far more plausible to assert that law cannot
be strong if the society in which it exists is not already functioning well
in terms of social cohesion. It is not that society depends upon law to
keep it from crumbling, but rather that law would be weak or crumble if
society was in a state of near collapse. A loss of values sufficiently severe to threaten the disintegration of society would begin a downward
spiral that would sweep law in its wake. Society may be ordered without
law (though not without rules), but law cannot exist without an already
organized society.
An obvious retort to my argument is to ask, if not law, then what are
the essential sources of social order? To that inquiry, after an initial admission of uncertainty, I have a three-part response. First, as indicated
above, I reject the very contrast between primitive and modern society.
Focusing on this framework has taken us down the wrong track. Habermas is wedded to a nineteenth-century antinomy, which was of dubious
validity at its inception and is hardly relevant today.
Second, I would say that just about everything that doesn't break society apart contributes to social order: intersubjectivity, shared language,
values, customs, conventions, beliefs, practices, habits of action, role orientations, organized complexes of action (institutional arrangements), associations, explicit coordination, shared knowledge, self-interested action,
survival instinct, altruism, the market, the reinforcing effects of the successful conduct of affairs, spontaneous social organization, and more, including all those traits selected by evolution which have helped the human
species thrive as social animals (as sociobiologists insist), and, yes, also
law. All of these influences likely exist to varying degrees in all societies
(pre-modern and modern). But in no single society, pre-modern, modern,

18.

See

CARL HEMPEL, AsPECTs OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION,

PHILOSOPHY oF SCIENCE 319-20

19.

AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE

(1965) (pressing this critique of functional analysis).

Habernas, supra note 3, at 937.
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or in-between, can it be said that law is the integrating mechanism." The
lesson found in many developing countries, which are "complex" and
"modem" by any usage of the term,2' is that law often plays a marginal role
in the integration of society.'
Third, I would suggest that the question is ill posed. Given the
prevalence of social order, instead of asking what are the essential
sources of social order, perhaps the more appropriate questions should
be, Why and under what circumstances do societies break down? The
focus would then shift to actual situations of societal breakdown, away
from imagined explanations of the sources of order based upon fictional
contrasts to a time before memory, back to concrete investigations of the
various reasons contributing to breakdown in specific historical situations. Following such investigations, I doubt that the failure of law as an
integrating mechanism to fill in for a value deficit would be identified as
a leading cause.
Thus far, arguing on a general level, I have expressed skepticism
about the assumption that modem society has suffered a significant value
breakdown that distinguishes it in any fundamental way from premodem society, and the assumption that law is the glue which holds
modem society together, by questioning both aspects of this assumption.
I have suggested that there may be elitist reasons why these assumptions
have held sway unchallenged for so long among social theorists. The
view of law from the bottom-from the poor in Western societies and the
general populace in non-Western societies-has seldom consisted of
grateful relief that law is there to hold society together, staving off chaos
and disorder. Contract and property laws are not significant factors in the
coordination of their daily existence because they have scant property
and enter into few contracts. The apparatus of the criminal law system is
either nowhere to be seen when they need it, or an unwelcome and oppressive intrusion in their lives. Too often, from these perspectives, law
has been viewed as unresponsive, unavailable, alien, impenetrable, and
as something to be feared or avoided. The disparity between this view of
law and the heroic view of law as essential to the survival of society
bears explanation. It is not enough to assert that the law they are exposed
to is deficient, a dirty shadow of what law should be. If society has not
collapsed and the law still works, it passes the test set up by social theorists for a law that is effectively serving its function of maintaining order
in society.

20. For a general argument in support of this assertion, see Brian Z. Tamanaba, An Analytical
Map of Social Scientific Approaches to the Concept of Law, 15 OXFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 501, 515

(1995).
21. Indeed, I would suggest that these societies are far more "complex" than Western societies, because they consist of extraordinary mixtures of transplanted and indigenous, modem and premodern.
22. See TAMANAHA, supranote 17, at 177-79.
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Rather than further press these points about the negative views of
law from below, which are well known, I will instead conclude this section by arguing that the most dominant experience of law from below is
that it is irrelevant.Habermas's thesis is that, in modem society, the primary function law performs is to stabilize behavioral expectations. This
task places law at the very heart of social action. To achieve this task,
law must inform actions both at a conscious and subconscious level
(where most behavioral expectations are lodged). In interpretive theory
generally,' it is ordinarily asserted that behavioral expectations are coordinated through shared social typifications, which are assumed and operate beneath our awareness unless brought to the surface through explicit
thematization, or by the disruption or disappointment of an expectation.
Whichever way it is understood, the view that law helps stabilize behavioral expectations assumes that law has an extraordinary degree of influence on our daily actions. One of the lessons of the legal realists and of
legal sociologists, however, is that often the general public is ignorant ofor doesn't pay attention to-vast portions of the law. ' People have knowledge about law only if they have a specific reason to know, usually that
knowledge is limited to the purpose at hand, and often that knowledge is
obtained only after what's done is done. With regard to most action, people are not informed at all of the law that might be relevant, and often they
hold erroneous assumptions about what the law requires. As Eugen Ehrlich
demonstrated, people seldom think about the law in the course of their
everyday actions.' When law is consciously contemplated, it is often
thought of in terms of a transaction cost, as a consideration when calculating the costs and benefits of the action. The most effective (in terms of
patterns of conforming behavior) laws are those which happen to coincide
with what people do anyway, out of custom or normative conviction.
However, in such cases, properly speaking, it is not the positive law that
stabilizes behavioral expectations but the shared underlying customs and
convictions. Given the literature which has raised doubts about the extensiveness of the knowledge about law of ordinary citizens,' and doubts
about the degree to which people order their activities based upon the dictates of legal norms, ' the notion that law stabilizes behavioral expectations
in modem society is highly questionable.

23. See ALFRED ScHurz, COLLECTED PAPERS 1: THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL REALITY (Maurice
Natanson ed., 1962). An extensive discussion of interpretive theory can be found in TAMANAHA,
supra note 17, at 79-101.
24. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SociO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A
SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 91-152 (1997).
25. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 486-506
(Walter Moll trans., 1936).
26. See generally ADAM PODGORECKI ET AL., KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION ABOUT LAW (C.M.
Campbell et al. eds., 1973) (discussing and providing support for the premise that the public is not as
familiar with the local law as was once presumed).
27. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991) (discussing how people routinely settle disputes without looking to the law).
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IH. THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LEGITIMATION IN LAW
The suspicions expressed in the preceding section gain momentum
when we shift to an examination of the discussion of legitimation of law.
I will explore three related points: (1) concern about legitimation as an
exercise; (2) whether discourse theory is a persuasive form of legitimation; and (3) whether law must be considered legitimate to be effective,
and, if so, whether legitimation follows from philosophical explorations.
All of these points, again, will be examined with the view from below in
mind.
A. The Dangersof the LegitimationEnterprise
A review of the histories of legal and social theory shows that they
are replete with discussions of the legitimacy of law.' More to the point,
the literature is filled with attempts to portray law as legitimate. This is
what I call the legitimation enterprise, an effort that has to an extraordinary degree occupied the attention of legal and social theorists. Many
such theorists, including Habermas, would protest indignantly and justifiably that their objective in setting up standards against which to test the
legitimacy of law is to provide for a critique of law, to improve the law
by demonstrating its illegitimacy, not to rationalize the law. The problem
is that it has seldom worked out that way in practice. Natural law theory
has perhaps had the most critical edge of any form of legitimation inquiry, because it conditioned the validity of positive law on its conformity to a higher standard. Frequently what has occurred, however, have
been pious assertions of the fidelity of positive law to natural law, and
thus natural law has been called upon to bolster the legitimacy of law.'
Legitimation is a two-sided enterprise: it can serve as a critique, or it can
rationalize the status quo. More often than not throughout history, for
whatever reason, the critical potential of the legitimation enterprise has
been sublimated and enlisted to serve as an apologist for the existing
system of law.
Suspicion of the legitimation enterprise should be heightened when,
as is the case with Habermas, an idealized standard is applied to test the
legitimacy of law. Recall that the test for the legitimacy of law is the
discourse principle: "Only those norms are valid to which all persons
possibly affected could agree as participants in rational discourses."
This standard is idealized in the sense that it is impossible to achieve.
28. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (manuscript in
progress, on file with the author).
29. Blackstone, for example, employed his theory of natural law as "the chief tool of rationalization" in support of the existing English legal system. DANIEL J. BOORsTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS
SCIENCE OF THE LAW 50 (1941). Roscoe Pound has pointed out that, despite its critical import,
natural law principles and natural rights have all too often merely been derived from, and used to
justify, the existing social order. See 1 RoscoE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 488 (1959).
30. Habermas, supranote 3, at 940 (emphasis added).
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Habermas does not intend nor expect to hold all legal norms to this standard. Rather, it operates as a kind of regulative ideal, something to aspire
toward, which has value even if we are always doomed to fall short. But
idealized standards are especially susceptible to the rationalizing tendency of legitimation. The following concerns regarding idealized standards will be taken up on turn: the immunity effect, forgetfulness, and
slippage.
Once an idealized standard that cannot be met is set out, it is easy to
have it both ways. The standard is immune to the complaint that it is unrealistic, because it was not intended to be achieved in reality-Habermas labels his discourse principle "counterfactual" to emphasize this
fact. " Yet at the same time, as long as it stands, its authority is drawn
upon continuously as a standard in relation to which judgments are made
about reality. That is a luxurious position to occupy. Habermas further
dances on two sides of the line by insisting that his "counterfactual" discourse principle is in fact "empirical," because the idealizations that underlie the discourse principle are presupposed in all actual communicative processes." Thus Habermas will, on the one hand, deflect the critique that his idealization is too unrealistic with the assertion that it is
meant to be counterfactual anyway, and, on the other hand, refute the
charge of unreality with the claim that it is in fact empirical.3 His straddle is successful only because it shifts what is being referred to as unrealistic. Regardless of whether the norms of rational speech are always
presupposed in acts of communication (and thus in a sense are empirical)
as Habermas insists,' the point is that it is unrealistic to suggest that the
legitimacy of legal norms be measured by a standard which requires that
they be assented to by all persons affected, because that will seldom if
ever happen.' Habermas repeatedly dismisses other theories as insufficiently empirical. His theory is subject to the same complaint. At some
point an idealization is so idealized that it is irrelevant beyond the general benefits gained by the imagining of Utopian scenarios. Calling it
counterfactual does not save it from having to answer to this charge.
31.

JORGEN HABERMAS, POSTMETAPHYSICAL THINKING: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 47 (Wil-

liam Mark Hohengarten trans., .1992).
32. As Habermas puts it: "These and similar idealizing yet unavoidable presuppositions-for
actual communicative practices possess a normative content that carries the tension between the
intelligible and the empirical into the sphere of appearances itself. Counterfactual presuppositions
become social facts." Id at 47.
33. This was Habermas's oral response at the panel discussion following my criticism of his
argument.
34. I am, for the sake of this argument, assuming Habermas is correct about the inevitable
posing of the presuppositions, though I believe there are substantial reasons to doubt this claim. It
seems that a more pragmatic theory of discourse---simply based upon the accumulated effects of
successes and failures of communication--can be constructed that would contest the assertion that
these presuppositions underlie all communication.
35. If Habermas insists that this counterfactual discourse principle is empirical, he would seem
to also necessarily insist that law is therefore legitimate, a dangerous assumption to make. See David
Dyzenhaus, The Legitimacy of Legality, 46 U. TORONTO LJ.129, 175 (1996).
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Forgetfulness occurs when conclusions are drawn about the legitimacy of real practices based upon application of the idealized standard.
What makes the discourse principle powerful-what allows it to escape
so many other problems that plague political and legal theory-is precisely that it is conditioned upon unanimous agreement in a rational
discourse of those affected. Anything short of that is not close. It throws
us back into the thick morass of dilemmas that the discourse principle
allowed us to escape only because it was grounded in universal agreement. Forgetfulness arises when theorists assert that a given lawgenerating practice that approximates the discourse principle is, therefore, legitimate. This is an unwarranted conclusion; one which cannot be
grounded in the discourse principle itself, because the demands of the
principle have not in fact been met. The discourse principle does not
contain within it the ability to provide guidance on how much approximation is enough to qualify as legitimate. To the contrary, nothing short
of total success in achieving the required universality would seem to be
enough. When perfection is the standard, and perfection is required because only that will do, as is the case with the discourse principle,' anything less than perfection is failure.
To the extent that no real situation can ever meet the discourse principle, it is not clear that is can ever be usefully applied as a concrete
standard with which to test real situations. In this respect there is a strong
similarity between the discourse principle and the idealized modeling
conducted in law and economics. Economic modeling is often so simplified that no conclusions can be drawn about the real world based upon
the model. As real conditions are added, the model becomes unworkable
owing to complexity and/or the conclusions change. The value of these
models is thus limited to helping us think about the situation, though the
temptation to draw real life conclusions based upon the model has often
proven too difficult to resist. The same is true of the discourse principle.
Slippage occurs when theorists adjust the idealization to make it
more realistic, or achievable. The fact that an idealized standard cannot
be met, combined with the consequent limitations in its actual application, leads inevitably to frustration. One obvious solution is to make the
standard less demanding. Sympathetic theorists have manifested this
impulse when urging that the unanimity requirement be dropped in favor
36. Robert Alexy explains why anything short of actual unanimity is in fact failure:
It is easy to see that any tension between basic rights and democracy must vanish immediately once one presupposes the perfect realization of this principle of democracy. By
'perfect realization" I mean a political state of affairs in which only such laws are enacted as have actually met with the agreement of all legal consociates in a discursive process of law-making. The identity of addressee and author of the law so often mentioned
by Habermas would be fully realized in this model. As the agreement of all legal consociates (to which in this ideal model each legal norm can be retraced) is a discursively purified and therefore a rational act of self-government, no norm can violate a basic right.
Robert Alexy, Basic Rights and Democracy in Jiirgen Habermas's ProceduralParadigm of the
Law, 7 RATIO JURIS 227, 232 (1994).
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of plain old majority assent. James Bohman, for example, argued that
"Unanimity is too strong a criterion and should be replaced by a weaker
standard of agreement: that all citizens have the opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process in such a way as to have the reasonable expectation that they may affect its outcome."37 Another tempting
form of slippage is in the suggestion, which assuredly will be made (if it
hasn't already), that the standard should not require universal acceptance
but only a fictional "acceptability."
Never mind that these more modest demands are far from the original discourse principle; and never mind that theorists wish to continue to
draw upon the prestige of the discourse principle even when applying
such lower standards. The most telling implication of steps to lessen the
standard is that as a result the idealization begins to sound a lot like
Western liberal democracies. That is the first-I dare say inevitablemove toward using the discourse principle (in watered down form) to rationalize and legitimate our existing practices. Our practice thereby becomes the ideal. That, as I warned earlier, is the perennial danger of engaging in the legitimation enterprise. Despite Habermas's impeccable
critical pedigree, it is difficult to read his argument without sliding to the
conclusion that our systems of liberal democracies and the rule of law,
despite their flaws, for the most part are deserving of a substantial claim
to legitimacy.
Not only does this make us self-satisfied about our own situation; the
greater problem is that it imposes on the rest of the world our own (liberal democratic) practice, but now in the guise of a universalistic ideal.
There are strong echoes of this kind of philosophical imperialism
throughout the history of Western relations with the non-Western world.
Although Habermas may insist that the discourse principle is flexible
enough to allow for different instantiations in non-Western societies, he
cannot argue that it is neutral and completely open to all non-Western
forms of the generation of norms. It does, at a minimum, require a form
of strong democracy.
B. Whether the DiscoursePrincipleIs a PersuasiveForm of
Legitimation
The discourse principle is procedural in nature. With the modern loss
of beliefs in absolute values, and the moral and ethical pluralism of modem society, it seems impossible to come up with substantive standards of
rightness with which to test the legitimacy of legal norms. In lieu of this,
the discourse principle suggests that when the proper decision-making
procedures are followed-through uncoerced discourse open equally to
37. James Bohman, Complexity, Pluralism, and the Constitutional State: On Habermas's
Faktizitat und Geltung, 28 L. & SOCY REV. 897, 921 (1994); see also William Rehg, Against Subordination: Morality, Discourse, and Decision in the Legal Theory of Jiirgen Habermas, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1156 (1996) (arguing that the unanimity standard is too high).
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all persons affected, with full knowledge and an attitude oriented toward
understanding, terminating only upon achievement of unanimous agreement-the outcome will be right, entitled to a claim of legitimacy.
Through this reasoning, legality consistent with the discourse principle is
itself legitimate, and its products morally worthy. In United State's legal
theory, Habermas' s proceduralist approach is reminiscent of Lon Fuller's
argument that the procedures of the rule of law have an affinity with
good, in the sense that they are unlikely to produce evil outcomes.' Thus
the morality of law inheres in its procedures.
Philosophers with far more ability and knowledge than I can no
doubt mount a more sophisticated response, but I cannot shake the sense
that there is no logical way to move from a procedure to a morally correct outcome. The barrier between procedure and substance (the content
produced by that procedure) seems impassable. A morally worthy procedure does not, by virtue of that fact, entail any guarantee of doing the
right thing (to put it in more common vernacular), though I would readily
agree that following a morally worthy procedure is a better way of making a decision than not. Another obvious objection to this procedural
legitimation of law, which I have already mentioned but will not elaborate in detail, is the abject inability of the production and application of
law to ever meet the conditions of the discourse principle. Constraints of
time and resources, and the reality that agreement will seldom be universal, cannot be overcome.
The response I will develop based upon the view from below is different. In Habermas's scheme, the view from below is essential because
the efficacy of the law is contingent upon the support of the populace,
and any form of legitimation must appeal to "a posttraditional moral consciousness of citizens who are no longer disposed to follow commands,
except for good reasons."39' Habermas thus identifies the view from below, not the view of theorists, as the one that ultimately matters. The
pertinent question, then, is whether the populace will agree with Habermas that legal norms are worthy of being followed solely because they
are produced consistent with the discourse principle, whether they will
count this as a "good reason."
The legitimacy of the procedure by which the decision is produced is
certainly not irrelevant. But the normal reaction to whether a legal norm or
action is right is still based upon whether one agrees or disagrees with the
outcome. Consistent with Habermas's universal assent ideal, of course,
everyone does agree with the outcome. However, this merely serves as a
reminder that we cannot slip from the ideal to the real to legitimate any
particular manifestation of law because law will seldom if ever meet this
condition. There will almost always be people who believe a given outcome
38.
39.

See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW (1964).
Habermas, supra note 3, at 938.
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to be wrong, and they will not be persuaded otherwise by the fact that good
procedures were followed. The fact that people who are on the losing side
of majority-rule decisions may nevertheless abide by the decisions does not
mean that they like the decisions, or think those decisions are correct, simply by virtue of the fact that they were made democratically.
There are deeper problems with the discourse procedure in relation
to the view from below. Foremost, it carries the odor of self-privileging:
the skill which philosophers and lawyers singularly excel at is discourse.
Talk is our trade. Even under the conditions of the idealized setting,
many people will be silenced through the weight of plain inability. The
old gap between formal and substantive equality is thus reconstituted
within the discourse principle. It is impossible to tweak the conditions of
formal discourse equality into substantive discourse equality because
there is no way to alter the unequal distribution of discursive talent.
There is another respect in which the discourse principle is selfprivileging, a respect which shades into the kind of paternalistic determining of life's choices that Habermas raised as an objection against
social welfare systems. Habermas declares that the proceduralist paradigm "has its focus on the citizen who participates in political opinionand will-formation." He continues:
Citizens can only arrive at fair regulations for their private status if
they make an appropriate use of their political rights in the public
domain. They must be willing to participate in the struggle over the
public relevance, the interpretation and evaluation of their own needs,
before legislators and judges 41can even know what it in each case
means to treat like cases alike.
These demands on the citizens are fundamental to Habermas's reconciliation of private and public autonomy, and thus form a key component
of his argument.
The view from below: "Give me a break! I have better things to do
with my time." If the discourse principle requires that every private citizen become the ideal citizen of the republic, it asks too much, and forces
a burdensome obligation upon the ordinary citizen, whose vision of
worthy or desirable pursuits often extends in other directions. Political
philosophers may be inclined to value this kind of participation (though
many write about it more so than actually engage in it), but imposing it
upon others can be oppressive.
Yet another response from below would be to point out the alienating, excluding effect of, and the irony of, a theory which makes an extensive case for open and accessible discourse, but is presented in a form
and manner that is comprehensible only to the initiated. There are sig-

40.
41.

Id. at 942.
Id.
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nificant discourse barriers inhibiting general access to discourse theory.
Although Habermas may respond that he and others can convey more
simplified versions of this theory in the realm of public discourse, this
raises further concerns. As pointed out earlier, the danger of watered
down versions is that they are altered in the course of the translation in a
manner that ends up bearing little resemblance to the carefully constructed original. The final message would likely end up being: discourse
theory (or a famous philosopher) tells us that democracy is good.
C. Whether Law Must Be ConsideredLegitimate to Be Effective, and, If
So, What Is the Most Likely Source of Such Legitimation.
Theorists are wont to declare that there is a "legitimation crisis" of
some kind, which must be solved if chaos or collapse is to be avoided,
whereupon they present their solution.' Against this tendency I will raise
two questions: Is legitimacy really so important to the functioning of
modern law?; and, to the extent that it is, What are the effective sources
of legitimacy? Although I had always assumed that legitimacy is indeed
essential to the functioning of a legal system, my experience as a lawyer
in Micronesia has shaken its hold.' Law in Micronesia, from the legal
code to the staff who implemented it, was transplanted virtually wholesale from the United States. From the standpoint of the general public,
the law was an alien presence with which they felt no sense of identification. It is not obvious that they saw it as legitimate at all, and, to the
extent that they did, this legitimacy was based on little more than its naked prestige as state law. Nevertheless, although the law had a limited
reach and a marginal influence in the maintenance of social order, it was
effective in the tasks it undertook.
Although it would be inappropriate to extrapolate from this situation
to law in the West, keep in mind that the situation of transplanted law is a
common one around the world. Moreover, it suggests at least that it is
not an absolute condition that the law be seen as legitimate to be effective. Many theorists, including Habermas, reason that if there were no
legitimation-based support, the legal system would be required to exert a
continuous and unsustainable application of force. The colonial experience-wherein effective legal systems were set up supported only by
small staffs of armed support-would seem to belie this common view.
There is an intermediate position between legitimacy and the constant application of coercion. That is, coexistence based upon accommodations on both sides. The law limits its reach, avoiding interventions
that will generate great resistance and often withdrawing when such resistance arises, for the remainder the populace more or less abides by the
42. Habernas presented an early work, Legitimation Crisis, in precisely this vein. See
HABERMAS, supra note 2. He has been repeating this theme ever since.
43. See TAMANAHA, supranote 17.
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dictates of the law. Inertia and the high threshold necessary to effect
change are majors factor in suppressing resistance that might otherwise
result from a lack of legitimation. In other words, a law not seen as legitimate will not need to exert coercion on a constant basis. The threat of
coercion often will be enough to suppress resistance until sufficient support is marshaled by the rebellious to have a reasonable prospect of prevailing in a contest with the law.
There is no point in further speculation along these lines. My intent
is not to assert conclusively that law can survive without legitimation,
but rather to encourage the reexamination of this assumption. There are
enough functioning legal systems around the world today that are viewed
with suspicion by the populace to suggest, perhaps, that legitimation is
not as essential as Habermas and others assume.
The second question relates to the sources of legitimacy. Recall that,
here, we are concerned specifically about legitimacy from the standpoint
of the populace, because that is what Habermas believes to be necessary.
I take it as self-evident that a minuscule proportion of the populace
would ever read or be directly exposed to Habermas's work. This lack of
access, and perhaps even lack of interest, suggests that if legitimation is
important, theorists are searching for it and producing it in the wrong
places. Discourse theory might still be effectual in so far as it influences
intellectuals and thereafter trickles down to affect ideas circulating in the
general public discourse. This kind of influence, however, is attenuated
at best, and, as I suggested earlier, the risk of distortion in the filtering
process is great.
Ideas about the legitimacy of law do circulate in society. In the
United States, our dual liberal and republican inheritances influence
these ideas. While the conflicts between these two streams of thought
trouble theorists, people seem capable of holding to both views, shifting
from one to the other without concern for inconsistencies and without
suffering cognitive breakdown or a loss of faith. These ideas are a part of
our tradition, passed on to each generation in various ways. Ideas about
the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of law also circulate in the public cultural
sphere, fed by the reporting on sensational cases, and by popular novels,
movies, and television shows about law. They derive from what is taught
in school, from slogans about democracy and the rule of law at an early
age to more serious scholarly examinations later on. They derive from
actual exposure to legal proceedings, to concrete experiences with lawmaking or the court system. They derive from a sense of the fairness of
procedures and a sense of fairness about the outcomes of the legal apparatus (to the extent that these are observed). Finally, these ideas of legitimacy derive from our experience of whether the law serves our interests and needs when called upon---on our common experience of
whether the law works reasonably well to satisfy the demands placed
upon it by those who resort to it. If it is correct that these are the primary
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sources of views of the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of law among the
populace, the most direct route would be to make sure that legal procedures have the appearance of fairness, that their results generally accord
with people's sense of what is right, and that the law more or less serves
their needs.
I would not suggest that discourse theory is irrelevant to this process,
by any means. But it does put into better perspective the likely marginal
impact of discourse theory on the fact of legitimation. This is an important consideration because Habermas has pinned the relevance of discourse theory, in part, on the service it can provide to legitimate law in
the modem era.
IV. WHAT ABOUT THE COMMON LAW?

To end this commentary I will offer a few brief remarks about a
major aspect of law that Habermas fails to mention in his otherwise exhaustive coverage of the core issues in legal theory, a rather gaping
omission from the standpoint of an Anglo-American lawyer: What about
the common law'?"
The common law poses a serious legitimation problem for legal
theorists. Precisely how unelected judges obtain the authority to formulate law has never been clear. When the subject arose in early theoretical
writings, the common law was portrayed as legitimate in so far as it
merely embodied the customs of the people, a dubious claim from the
outset. Consistency with custom allowed the common law to aver a kind
of consent, since custom was thought to epitomize long-standing consent
through ongoing and widespread conformity of action. Later, in theoretical writings, the grounds proffered for the legitimacy of the common law
shifted from custom to consistency with natural law precepts; and still
later, it shifted to consistency with reason.' All the while, there also have
been claims that the judges were not actually creating law-they were
merely discovering the law that was already there.
Reading this history, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that theorists were scrambling for whatever arguably respectable basis might exist
to support the common law. As custom, then natural law, lost their ability to serve as props, only reason was left to uphold the validity of the
common law. The Realist critique essentially eliminated any final illusions about the common law, leaving itto drift without a clear source of
legitimation. Dworkin's views of the integrity of the law, successively
authored and worked pure by generations of Herculean judges, is the
44. For an excellent exploration and critique of Habermas's theory from the standpoint of the
common law, see Catherine Kemp, Habermas Among the Americans: Some Reflections on the
Common Law, 76 DENY. U.L. REv. 961 (1999).
45. See PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION, THE STORY OF AN IDEA 69 (1980); Roscoe Pound,
The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,24 HARv. L. REv. 591,604 (1911).
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most recent candidate for a replacement, but it is implausible on its merits, and when seen in the context of this history it must be viewed with
skepticism.
Habermas makes, at best, a weak effort to legitimate the common
law. Perhaps, as a native of a civil law country, he did not feel the need
to legitimate the common law, or perhaps he himself could not understand how the common law could be seen as legitimate. If the discourse
principle were applied to the common law, it would fail miserably.
My points are twofold. First, to the extent that the common law is
adjudged substantially inadequate by comparison to the civil law (or to
legislatively generated law) when tested by the discourse principle, we
should take note. After all, despite legislative inroads, much of our basic
contract, property, and tort law are still grounded in the common law. Second, contrary to the import of the first point, it is not clear whether we
should care. After all, the common law has thrived for centuries without
ever having clear grounds of legitimation. Being told that it once again
falls short seems entirely beside the point. That must say something about
the legitimation enterprise.
V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would like to state my specific underlying concern
with discourse theory, and explain the skeptical tone of this article. I
have no concerns about Professor Habermas. His humanitarianism is
unquestioned, and his critical credentials are beyond reproach. In his
writings as well as in person, he is respectful and open-minded, and indeed to a remarkable degree he appears to live by the demands of the
discourse principle.
However, he cannot control the ways in which his work is used. I
fear Habermas's theory will make it more difficult to raise what is always an essential question: "Is the law good or right?" Discourse theory
is "meant to guarantee that all formally and procedurally correct outcomes enjoy a presumption of legitimacy." Accordingly, the initial answer to the question of whether the law is good or right would be: "Of
course it is right, we generated the norm in a manner closely adhering to
the dictates of discourse theory."
The troubling aspect of this response is that it does not answer the
question on it merits. Rather, it deflects the question by pointing out how
the law at issue was created. To get to the merits of the question, the inquisitor must first demonstrate that the process of generating the norm
fell substantially short of what the discourse principle requires. No doubt
there also will be a dispute about whether the extent to which it fell short
was enough to dispel the presumption of legitimacy. Remember that dis-

46.

HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 127.
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course theory itself requires perfection and thus provides no guidance on
how much approximation is enough. This dispute will take the inquiry
even further away from the question at hand, resulting in a potentially
lengthy delay, and going down a path that may have no resolution.
Only after going through this process can you even begin to examine the question of whether the law is good or right. Discourse theory
thus creates a barrier that protects law from facing this crucial question.
Law needs no such protection. It is powerful enough to protect is own
integrity without the cover provided by discourse theory. Law at base
entails the application (and threat) of coercion. For this reason alone, it
must always be directly subject to the question of whether it is good or
right.

